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The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession:
Can Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?
Eugene Kontorovich*

I. INTRODUCTION
The central principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), now incorporated into the rules of the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), is the prohibition of discriminatory restrictions on international trade,
with a particular emphasis on rooting out protectionism. However, some
scholars contend that a trade restriction's validity under GATT depends not just
on its substantive content but also on the motives behind its adoption. They
maintain that GATT applies only to trade restrictions imposed to protect
domestic industry from foreign competition or for other "economic" purposes,
and not to restrictions adopted for non-economic "foreign policy" reasons.' In
this view, even overtly discriminatory trade restrictions, such as boycotts of
other nations, do not fall within GATT's purview if implemented for reasons of
foreign policy. While this "foreign policy" exception has been endorsed by the
Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law. The author thanks George
Mason's Law and Economics Center for providing research support. Email: ekontoro@
gmu.edu.
See, for example, John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can Helms-Burton Be Challenged under IFTO?, 27
Stetson L Rev 1313, 1332 (1998) (arguing that in practice, GATT recognizes distinctions
based on the motivation behind a trade restriction, and so a "political decision with
economic consequences" is not considered a breach of GATT obligations); Barry E. Carter,
InternationalEconomic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regme 136 (Cambridge 1988)
(discussing existence of "tacit exception" to GATT for actions involving "broader political
questions" that go beyond "trade considerations," and describing such an exception as
"consistent" with GATT). The foreign policy exception is sometimes referred to as a
"political purpose" exception, but such a designation is overbroad to the point of
uselessness. Even purely protectionist measures arise from wholly political considerationsthe desire to gratify a domestic industry. Indeed, any policy a nation pursues is in some sense
political. Of course, trade policy and foreign policy are also intertwined, and a "trade war"
combines protectionism with foreign policy concerns. This Article will use the term "foreign
policy" to refer to policies prompted not by protectionism but rather by considerations such
as power, ideology, ethnic sympathy and hatred, alliances, and religion.
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influential American Law Institute,2 it has otherwise received very little attention
from commentators.' Scholars have not analyzed whether the purported
exception would be consistent with the text, structure and purposes of GATT.
The legitimacy of the purported "foreign policy" exception is, however,
now a matter of pressing concern. Saudi Arabia, the second largest economy
outside the WTO system, has reached an advanced stage in accession
negotiations and is expected to be admitted into the organization in the next few
years. Saudi Arabia maintains a total boycott of Israel and a secondary and
tertiary boycott of firms and individuals in the United States and elsewhere that
trade with Israel.4 The boycott is part of the broader Arab League Boycott of
Israel ("the Boycott").' While the United States has raised the boycott issue in
accession talks with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia might be allowed to accede with
its boycott intact.
Because the Boycott appears to be at least a prima fade violation of
GATT/WTO trade rules, Saudi Arabia's potential accession puts in sharp relief
the question of whether trade restrictions motivated by foreign policy concerns
fall within GATT's purview. The exception appears to be the only rationale
under which the secondary and tertiary boycott could be reconciled with GATT
obligations. Not surprisingly, Arab League members seeking to join the WTO
2

See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 812 comment a
(1987) ("Mhe GATT has regulated devices employed by states to gain economic advantage
for their products over the products of other states; it has been thought to be inapplicable to
trade practices to achieve non-economic ends such as national security or foreign policy
purposes.").
The Restatement notes that "it has been thought" that GATT contains such an exception,
but it does not say who did the thinking. See id. Some scholars have cast doubt on the
existence of the foreign policy exception but have also not elaborated the basis of their view.
See Raj Bhala, InternationalTrade Law. Theory and Practice273 (Lexis 2d ed 2001) ("[A]side from
non-application, there is no broad 'political' exception to the MFN obligations in the GATTWTO regime that would easily justify [the United States' trade restrictions against
Communist countries under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.]"); Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz,
InternationalRegulation and Control of the Production and Use of Chemicals and Pesticides:Perspectivesfor
a Convention, 13 Mich J Ind L 653, 693 (1992) ("[T]here is no mechanism to allow GATT
Contracting Parties to restrict exports for foreign policy reasons.").
Secondary boycotts impose trade restrictions on nations or firms that trade with the nation
subject to the primary boycott. Tertiary boycotts go one degree of connection further by
imposing such restrictions on those who trade with those who trade with the originally
boycotted nation. See Raj Bhala, NationalSecurity and InternationalTrade Lav: What the GATT
Says, and What the United States Does, 19 U Pa J Ind Econ L 263, 284 (1998) (explaining that
the distinction between primary and secondary boycott is that while the former is "an act of
self-restraint by the boycotting country," the latter "is the attempt to limit the extent of
economic dealings of third countries with the target country").
Two other League members that maintain the Boycott, Algeria and Lebanon, have also
begun the WTO accession process, but their candidacies have not advanced as far as has
Riyadh's.
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have explicitly invoked this exception to justify the Boycott.6 For example,
Algeria has declared in its accession application that "[a]s a member of the
League of Arab States, Algeria applies the different degrees of the embargo
decreed by this institution in 1954 with regard to products originating in Israel.
This measure is of apoliticaland non-commercial nature."7
This Article uses the occasion of Saudi Arabia's accession bid to examine
whether GATT applies to trade restrictions imposed solely for foreign policy
purposes. It finds that an exception for measures motivated by foreign policy
would be inconsistent with the language, structure, usage, purpose, and history
of GATT. However, some foreign policy-oriented boycotts could be sustained
under specific GATT provisions, such as Article XXI's exceptions for national
security. This Article then considers the implications of these findings for the
WTO accession of nations, like Saudi Arabia, that adhere to the Arab League
Boycott. While the discussion of the purported foreign policy exception will be
general, it will often focus on the Arab League Boycott, and Saudi Arabia's role
in it, as the main example. This is because the Boycott is the oldest, broadest,
and most systematic set of foreign policy trade restrictions in place today and
because Saudi Arabia's imminent accession makes its role in the Boycott an
urgent question for international trade policy.
Only the secondary and tertiary boycotts-but not the direct Boycott of
Israel-would conflict with WTO rules, as Part III.B.1 explains. Thus this
Article's discussion of the Arab League Boycott will focus on its secondary and
tertiary elements-the parts of the Boycott that could not be easily justified
under the plain text of GATT. This Article argues that the accession of nations
that enforce the secondary and tertiary Boycott would undermine the WTO's
commitment to free trade. It would also deprive current members of the
benefits that the organization is supposed to secure. Moreover, this harm could
not be effectively remedied through the WTO dispute-resolution process. Thus
the Article concludes that the United States should use its considerable clout in
the accession process to require boycotting nations to abandon the secondary
and tertiary prongs of the Boycott as a condition of membership.
Part I sketches the history of the Boycott and Saudi Arabia's role in it. Part
II considers whether the text and structure of GATT allow for an implied
6

See Edgar C. Cadano, Economist ClarifiesLocal Misconceptions on W'TO, Saudi Gazette (Sept 25,
1999) ("WTO does not interfere in trade restrictions if they are imposed for other [than]
economic reasons. . . . For instance WTO membership does not interfere with the Arab
boycott of Israel.") (quoting statements of Henry T. Azzam of Riyadh's National
Commercial Bank).
World Trade Organization, Accession ofAlgeria:Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime, WTO Doc
No WT/ACC/DZA/1 (uly 11, 1996) available online at <http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/DZA1.WPF> (visited Oct 9, 2003) (emphasis added).
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foreign policy exception. It shows that the existence of specific, narrow
exceptions in the treaty argues against the recognition of the foreign policy
purpose exception, because the specific exceptions would be made nugatory or
superfluous by the broader, non-textual one. It also discusses the serious
interpretive and adjudicative difficulties that would be created by the recognition
of the foreign policy exception. Part III examines state practice under GATT
and finds that states have very rarely attempted to justify their trade restrictions
by invoking such an exception. When states have used the foreign policy excuse,
it has usually been rejected by other nations and scholars. Part IV considers the
broader free trade purposes of the WTO and GATT. It shows that because the
free trade system was designed to promote not just prosperity but peaceful and
amicable relations between member states, the purported exception would
defeat one of the major goals of the WTO. Part V summarizes the Article's
broader conclusion that GATT does not support a foreign policy exception. It
then discusses the specific implications of this finding for the United States'
attitude toward Saudi accession. It concludes that the US should condition the
accession of Arab League members on the abandonment of the secondary and
tertiary Boycott.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LONGEST BOYCOTT
The Arab League, an umbrella organization that today includes twenty-one
states, has banned trade with Jews in Palestine since before the creation of the
State of Israel.8 Soon after Israel gained independence, the League created a
complex, centralized boycott apparatus. The Boycott has three tiers: a primary
boycott of Israel and a secondary and tertiary boycott of those trading with
Israel. The specific conduct prohibited by the Boycott is described in a dense
and comprehensive set of regulations.
Briefly, the primary boycott bars League members from having direct trade
relations with Israel or Israelis.9 The secondary and tertiary boycotts reach far
more broadly to ban trade with non-Israeli companies that have ties with Israel.
Thus League members boycott companies of any nationality that happen to have
offices or branches in Israel, use Israeli components or ingredients, advise or
consult with Israeli companies, license intellectual property in Israel, or have any
of a wide variety of other relationships to the Jewish State. Indeed, a person or
firm could be boycotted even without having engaged in any commercial activity
with Israel. The Boycott also applies to firms with "Zionist sympathizers" in
executive positions or on their boards, people and firms who join foreign-Israeli
8

See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 3 Trade Controls for Political Ends 313 (Matthew Bender 2d ed

1983).
9

Id at 314-15.
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chambers of commerce, or those who engage in political activity sympathetic to
Israel. The Boycott also applies to firms that do business with any other firm
that meets the description above. As one commentator has put it, "[t]he nature
and detail of these rules reflect the boycotting countries' tolerance for only the
most minimal contacts with Israel."' 10
The League's Boycott Office, manned by a large staff, blacklists people and
companies falling into any of the above categories. The blacklist circulates to
League members, who then either boycott the listed entities or prevail upon
them to abandon their ties to Israel." The blacklist is reported to have contained
15,000 firms in its heyday in the 1970s, ranging from Aetna Life and Casualty to
Xerox,12 as well as individuals like Elizabeth Taylor (who had bought Israel
Bonds). However, the secretive Boycott Office has never made its list public.
This helps coerce those placed on the list into breaking their relations with
Israel. Since several nations, including the United States, prohibit their firms
from complying with the Boycott, 3 publishing the blacklist would invite
domestic regulatory scrutiny of blacklisted entities and make it more difficult for
them to agree to the terms of the Boycott. Thus the Boycott's biggest effect is
deterrent: the only way a company can avoid both the Boycott and violating
domestic laws is to not even consider entering into any dealings with Israel in
the first place. 4
Egypt and Jordan abandoned all phases of the Boycott, in 1980 and 1995
respectively, after signing peace agreements with Israel.'5 In 1994, in the wake of
the Oslo Accords, the Gulf Cooperation Council-a six-nation group that
includes Saudi Arabia-agreed to end the secondary and tertiary boycotts. The
next year, Saudi Arabia applied for membership in the WTO. When queried
about the Boycott during the accession process by concerned members, Riyadh
6
responded that it was over.

it

Howard N. Fenton II, United States Anibocott Laws: An Assessment of Their Impact Ten Years
afterAdoption, 10 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 211, 227 (1987).
Lowenfeld, 3 Trade Controlsat 313 (cited in note 8).

12

See id at 318-19.

13

15

50 USC app § 2410 (2000) (prohibiting "United States persons" from complying with or
assisting in the secondary and tertiary boycott). Several other nations have also adopted antiboycott laws, though they have apparently not enforced them as vigorously as has the United
States. See Carter, InternationalEconomic Sanctions at 177-78 (cited in note 1).
See id at 178.
Robert A. Diamond, U.S. Antiboycott Law and Regulations,830 PLI/Comm 721, 730 (2001).

16

World Trade Organization, Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:Questions and Replies, WTO

10

14

Doc No WT/ACC/SAU/6 at Q38-39 (Sept 30, 1996), available online at
<http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/SAU6WPF> (visited Oct 9,
2003) (requesting Saudi Arabia to "confirm" removal of boycott); Tomer Broude, Accession to
the W/TO: Current Issues in the Arab World, 32 J World Trade 147, 156-57 (Dec 1998)
(recounting Saudi evasiveness in describing status of Boycott in its accession materials).
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This satisfied the existing signatories, and the Saudis proceeded down the
accession path. It turns out that Saudi participation in the broader boycott did
not end after 1994, though enforcement greatly diminished. The Commerce
Department continued to catch American firms that did business with the
Saudis complying with the Boycott. As late as 1997, Saudi Arabia made more
demands on US firms to comply
with the Boycott than any League nation other
17
Emirates.
Arab
United
than the
The Saudis began enforcing the Boycott with greater vigor in 2000, as part
of the broader Arab League economic action against Israel that coincided with
the outbreak of the large-scale Palestinian violence in Israel. Saudi Foreign
Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal proclaimed that it "is necessary that there should
not be any form of cooperation with Israel, most importantly any [economic]
dealings with it." 8 In 2001, seventeen nations of the Arab League, including
prospective WTO-member Saudi Arabia, met in Damascus to rededicate
themselves to the Boycott. Saudi Arabia alone has blacklisted almost 200 foreign
firms-some American-for selling Israeli-made goods in the kingdom and has
recently taken various administrative measures to tighten boycott enforcement.' 9
"[T]he boycott results in economic harm to U.S. firms in terms of lost sales,
foregone opportunities and distortion of investment decisions," the United
States Trade Representative ("USTR") concluded in a report published last
year. 20

III. GATT TEXT AND THE PURPORTED FOREIGN POLICY
EXCEPTION
A. GATT OBLIGATIONS AND EXPLICIT EXCEPTIONS
GATT's central principle is that member nations must trade with each
other on non-discriminatory terms. The most significant obligations imposed by
the treaty all involve a commitment to non-discrimination: that signatories
afford each other most-favored nation status ("MFN"), refrain from imposing
quantitative limits on the volume of cross-border trade, and treat each other's
17

is
19
20

See Internal Revenue Service, Boycott Reports, 1997 and 1998, 20 Statistics of Income 154 (Dec
22, 2001) (on file with author); see also Broude, 32 J World Trade at 154-55 (cited in note
16) (describing evidence of secondary and tertiary boycott being applied against European
corporations in 1997 and 1998).
Foreign MinisterStates Position on Iraq,Aid to Palestinians,AI-Hayat (London) (BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts Mar 28, 2001).
Michael Freund, Saudis Tighten Anti-Israel Boycott, Jerusalem Post 1 (Aug 6, 2002).
US Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers 1, 3 (2002),
available online at <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2002/arableague.PDF>
9, 2003).

(visited Oct
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exports as they do their own domestic products ("national treatment"). 2' These
provisions ban boycotts outright, since boycotts single out some nations for
unfavorable treatment and treat those nations' products differently from those
of other signatories, as well as the boycotting nation's own products.
GATT makes no mention of a "foreign policy" exception. Those who
think such an exception exists concede that it must be read into the agreement. 2
However, an interpretation that departs from the terms of a carefully negotiated
legal instrument should have strong support in history, purpose, or policy.
Before considering whether there are such non-textual justifications for the
exception, it must be determined that the purported exception is at least not
inconsistentwith the text and structure of GATT.
GATT contains several explicit exceptions that authorize trade restrictions
undertaken for non-economic purposes that would otherwise violate Article I
and other GATT obligations. This demonstrates that GATT does recognize the
legitimacy of at least some non-economic motives. The exceptions fall into two
broad categories. Article XX, entitled "General Exceptions," enumerates ten
types of permissible trade restrictions. The broadest of these exceptions allows
nations to adopt discriminatory and restrictive trade laws in order to protect
public health, the environment, and public morals.23 Other items on the Article
XX laundry list are quite specific, such as the allowance for trade restrictions on
products of prison labor and the allowance for measures designed to prevent the
export of cultural artifacts, gold, and silver.
Article XX deals with trade restrictions adopted for reasons of domestic
policy other than protectionism. But the structure of the Article shows that
GATT does not permit any measure that is motivated by non-economic factors.
Rather, GATT requires a discriminatory measure to satisfy two conditions. The
chapeau to Article XX establishes lack of a protectionist purpose as a necessary
but not sufficient condition. The measure must also fall within one of the
enumerated exceptions set out in the lettered sections below the chapeau. If
GATT tolerated all measures adopted for non-economic purposes only the
chapeau would be needed, and not the ten specific sections under the chapeau.
21

22
23

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts II and IV, GAIT BISD 3-5, 8 (1969), 61 Star
pts 5, 6, TIAS No 1700 at 639, 55 UN Treaty Ser 194 (1950), as amended (hereinafter
GATT). See also, John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT § 11.3 (Bobbs-Merrill
1969) (observing that the non-discrimination principle expresses itself in several GATT
provisions).
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 812 comment a
(cited in note 2). See also Carter, InternationalEconomicSanctions at 136 (cited in note 1).
See GATT art XX(a) (cited in note 21) (allowing restrictions to protect public morals);
GATT art XX(b) (cited in note 21) (allowing restrictions "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life and health"); GATT art XX(g) (cited in note 21) (allowing restrictions
"relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources" under certain circumstances).
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Furthermore, the chapeau states that even if a measure has non-economic
purposes and fits within one of the Article's ten sections, it still runs afoul of
GATT if applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Yet most sanctions
adopted for foreign policy purposes are necessarily and intentionally
discriminatory-their selectivity is what makes them effective tools of foreign
policy.
Article XXI, the national security exception, permits signatories to adopt
any measures they consider necessary to protect their own "essential security
interests." The drafters of GATT realized that nations would be unlikely to
abide by the agreement if it meant compromising their security. Clearly, there is
a substantial overlap between foreign policy and security concerns. And indeed,
many commentators believe that the security exception is sometimes abusively
invoked to justify measures undertaken for more general foreign policy reasons,
such as ideological opposition to a signatory's regime.
The first and third sections of Article XXI are narrow and uncontroversial.
Neither could be used to justify most political sanctions. Section (a) allows
nations not to "furnish any information" that would harm their national security,
and section (c) allows nations to impose trade restrictions when obligated to do
so under the United Nations Charter. The latter provision allows nations to
comply with Security Council embargoes and other sanctions and prevents the
decisions of that body from creating conflicting obligations for GATT
signatories. Article XXI(b) is the heart of the national security exception and is
recognized as the most sweeping exception in GATI', allowing for trade
restrictions in a far broader range of situations than the other two sections.2 4
Arab League members have in the past described the Boycott as a national
security measure, and Saudi Arabia has adopted this position in an accession
document. 25 This position has considerable merit for some boycotting nations.
Lebanon and Syria, for example, are still engaged in intermittent hostilities with
Israel, and Israel has until recently occupied Lebanese territory and continues to
hold land taken from Syria. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has no objectively
plausible grounds for invoking Article XXI. Israel has never attacked or
threatened Saudi Arabia, and Jerusalem certainly has no designs on Arabian land.
Furthermore, there have been no hostilities between the two states since the
1948 War of Independence, when Saudi Arabia joined other Arab nations in an
invasion of the newly-created Jewish State. Indeed, several of Saudi Arabia's
neighbors, such as Yemen and Djibouti, have dropped the secondary and
tertiary Boycott, with Qatar and Oman even opening trade relations with Israel.
24

See, for example, Bhala, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L at 266-67

25

section (b) as the "most important and controversial... exception").
See Broude, 32 J World Trade at 156 (cited in note 16).

(cited in note 4) (describing
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This further undermines Riyadh's suggestion that Israel poses a security threat to
Arabia.
More importantly, the world at large does not plausibly threaten the
"essential security interests" of Saudi Arabia or other Arab states, yet it is the
world at large that must comply with the secondary and tertiary boycotts. Many
nations and commentators have taken the position that non-primary boycotts
could never pass muster under Article XXI; 2 6 one might think that the word
"essential" precludes measures against nations that have a very indirect, remote,
and attenuated relationship to the security interest in question. Certainly Saudi
Arabia and other non-neighboring Arab states are hostile to Israel, but to conflate
hostility with hostilities would be to turn Article XXI's exception for "essential
security interests" into an exception for any interests that matter to a nation.
Broad as it is, Article XXI(b) has limits. It does not allow trade restrictions
premised simply on security interests but rather on "essential security interests."
Furthermore, it enumerates only three particular types of essential interests that
would permit discriminatory trade restrictions. These involve i) anything relating
to fissionable materials; ii) anything relating to the arms trade or military
supplies; and iii) measures taken in "time of war or other emergency in
international relations. ' 2 Thus apart from discrimination in times of war or
comparably critical situations, the supposedly broad security exception only
allows restrictions relating to military materiel, arms, and nuclear materials and is
thus inapplicable to most trade in goods and services.
The purported foreign policy exception would be far broader than the
security exception, which itself is widely viewed as overly malleable. Because it
has no grounding in GATT text, the foreign policy exception has no discernible
limits; it would seem to span the entire range of potential foreign policy
concerns. Yet national security concerns are a subset of foreign policy concerns.
Under Article XXI, only a subset of actual (to say nothing of contrived) security
concerns warrants discriminatory trade restrictions. Since the foreign policy
exception does not have such narrow criteria for its invocation, it would entirely
subsume the security exception and render the carefully drafted restrictions on
the latter useless. Indeed, the foreign policy exception could also swallow up the
general exceptions of Article XX. One can easily argue that any restriction on
foreign trade that is not motivated by protectionism is a foreign policy measure
because it deals with relations with other nations. The foreign policy exception
would not simply add an extra exception to GATT-it would effectively
supplant Articles XX and XXI.

26
27

See, for example, id at 157.
GATI? art XXI(b)(iii) (cited in note 21).
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This would contradict the basic interpretive rule-of-thumb expresio unius est
exclusio alterius the expression of one thing (the particular exceptions in Articles
XX and XXI) excludes other things (any implicit exceptions). And while expresio
unius has its limits, the canon makes the most sense when, as with GATT, the
express exceptions are numerous, carefully drafted, and detailed. The case for
expresio unius is also stronger when the subject matter of the proposed implicit
exception was within the contemplation of the drafters. Exceptions for foreign
policy measures were clearly considered by GATT's authors; both Articles XXI
and XXXV address, in different ways, foreign policy concerns. Finally, the case
for expresio unius becomes compelling when reinforced by other canons of
construction. Here, recognizing the atextual exception would make much of the
textual provisions nugatory, violating another recognized principle of statutory
interpretation.
A foreign policy exception would allow for limitless abuse. The breadth of
Article XXI(b) is already seen by commentators as GATT's Achilles' heel, too
easy to invoke in an opportunistic and bad faith manner.2 8 Much recent WTO
scholarship has focused on developing procedures to restrain abuses of that
article. Most of these attempts focus on ensuring an objective reading of the
exception's language, or at least a good faith connection between the ostensible
reasons for the invoking the exception and the text of Article XXI(b), which
insists that the national security purpose be "essential" and limited to war or
military supplies.2 9 Recognizing a general foreign policy exception would
frustrate all efforts at cabining the security exception. It would create the same
potential for abuse as Article XXI(b) but on a far greater scale.
B. THE OPT-OUT CLAUSE
1. The Legality of the Primary Boycott
If Saudi Arabia were to accede to the WTO, the primary boycott of Israel
would most likely not cause any conflict with GATT requirements. Article
XXXV, known as the "non-application clause," allows a newly acceding nation
28

29

Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountabilioy for the Use of the WTO Securiy
Exemption: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance between
Sovereignty and Multilateralism,26 Yale J Intl L 413, 423 (2001); Bhala, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L at
272-73 (cited in note 4); Rend E. Browne, Note, Revisiting 'National Security" in an
Interdependent World: The GATTArticle XXI Defense after Helms-Burton, 86 Georgetown L J 405,
409 (1997) ("[Tjhe national security exception . . . poses a latent, lingering threat to the
stability of the fledgling [WTO], as . .. [it could] encourage other countries to carve out
'national security' exceptions to justify any number or type of international trade
restrictions.").
See, for example, Cann, 26 Yale J Intl L at 467-68 (cited in note 28); Bhala, 19 U Pa J Ind
Econ L at 275-76 (cited in note 4).
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to opt out of GATT's requirements with respect to particular members.3 ° Nonapplication works both ways, and the member towards whom it is invoked is
also freed from any GAIT obligations towards the invoking nation.3' After an
invocation of Article XXXV, both nations are members of the WTO, but the
WTO obligations are not in force between the two nations.32 Saudi Arabia would
almost certainly invoke Article XXXV with respect to Israel upon its accession.
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, who also participated in the Boycott, invoked this
option with respect to Israel upon their accession to GATT.33 Indeed, the nonapplication clause was created to allow pairs of nations that do not recognize
each other to join the agreement and thus at least secure free trade benefits in
their relations with all other nations.34
If Saudi Arabia declares GATT obligations non-applicable between it and
Israel, the primary boycott would not violate WTO rules. Indeed, even adamant
opponents of the Boycott concede that the primary level is of no concern to
nations other than Israel and raises no questions of international trade law
' 3
because "the choice of trading partners is anyone's right, the Arabs' included. 1
But Saudi Arabia will certainly not use the opt-out clause with respect to the US
and Europe, the main targets of the secondary and tertiary Boycott, because it
seeks WTO membership precisely to secure better trade terms with these large
economies. The other Arab nations that have acceded with the Boycott intact
have not invoked the opt-out clause with respect to the United States. Yet nonapplication towards Israel does not improve the legal status of the secondary and
tertiary Boycott since it coercively distorts the "third-country" firms' choice of
trading partners. 36 Thus the remainder of this Article leaves the primary Boycott
to one side to focus on the compatibility of the Boycott's secondary and tertiary
rings with WTO obligations.

30
31

GATT art XXXV,

32

1(b) (cited in note 21).
Lei Wang, Non-Application Issues in the GATT and the WITO, 28 J World Trade 49, 60 (Apr
1994) (observing that non-application is automatically a "two-way street").
See id at 49-50.

33

See Lowenfeld, 3 Trade Controls at 322 (cited at note 8); Ariel M. Ezrahi, Note, Opting Out of

Opt-Out Clauses. Removing Obstacles to InternationalTrade and InternationalPeace, 31 L & Poly in
34

35
36

Ind Bus 123, 138 n 65 (1999).
Wang, 28 J World Trade at 54-55 (cited in note 31) (stating that the non-application clause
was put into GATT to allow India and Pakistan to join although they had no diplomatic
relations with South Africa because of the apartheid policy).
Walter Henry Nelson and Terence C.F. Prittie, The Economic War against the Jews 28 (Random
House 1977).
See Broude, 32 J World Trade at 156 (cited in note 16) ("[N]on-application towards Israel
cannot provide legal relief for secondary and tertiary boycott practices, as they constitute
barriers to trade with Members with which Saudi Arabia will apply the WTO agreements in
full.").
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2. The Illegality of the Secondary and Tertiary Boycotts
The existence of the non-applicability provision reinforces the conclusion
that GATT applies in full to secondary and tertiary boycotts adopted for foreign
policy purposes. GATT provides a mechanism for primary boycotts within the
free trade system. The lack of such a mechanism for the broader class of
boycotts suggests that these were regarded as entirely incompatible with the free
trade system. This conclusion is reinforced by the general hostility nations have
towards secondary and tertiary boycotts: they are looked upon with disfavor
because they attempt to impose one nation's laws extraterritorially. Given the
extraterritoriality problem, one would expect that if GATT tolerated such
measures, the tolerance would be made explicit.
Article XXXV was specifically designed as GATT's safety-valve for foreign
policy motivated measures.37 This suggests that foreign-based restrictions do in
fact fall within the purview of GATT. If GATT was not seen as applying to
restrictions adopted purely for reasons of foreign policy-like the Indo-Pakistani
boycott of South Africa-then there would be no need for the opt-out clause in
the first place.
The opt-out clause was made narrow38 "to restrict the invocation of the
non-application clause and to minimize its effect, as the clause was regarded as
an exception to the rule of most-favoured-nation."39 The narrowness of the
clause shows that a broad foreign policy exception goes against the spirit of
GATT, which attempts to minimize the intrusions of foreign policy
considerations into the sphere of international trade. Also, the specific
limitations on Article XXXV support the view that secondary boycotts are
entirely incompatible with the GATT structure. Article XXXV requires that optouts be declared with respect to particular nations: it does not authorize blanket
opt-outs. Similarly, it does not authorize opting out with respect to specific
firms, in the manner of the Arab League blacklist but only with respect to
countries. For example, an opt-out styled a "declaration on non-applicability to
any firms that trade with firms that trade with Israel" would be ineffectual under
Article XXXV.

38

This is generally how it has been used in practice: the clause has been relied on many times
by nations that do not recognize or have profound political disagreements with other
signatories. See Nelson and Prittie, The Economic War against the Jews at 56-58 (cited in note
35) (discussing examples and causes of Article XXXV invocations).
For example, non-application must be declared at the time of accession; once a nation enters

39

GATT, it cannot invoke Article XXXV when it deems it convenient. See GATT art XXXV,
1(b) (cited in note 21).
Nelson and Prittie, The Economic War againsttheJen's at 55 (cited in note 35).
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IV. PRECEDENTS FOR A FOREIGN POLICY EXCEPTION

This Part examines whether state practice uhnder GATT reveals an explicit
or tacit endorsement of the foreign policy exception in general or the Arab
League Boycott in particular. The legality of such measures has never been
adjudicated by WTO or GATT dispute-resolution panels. 40 Most foreign policy-

motivated trade restrictions have either been imposed by non-GATT members
(such as the Arab states) or by the United States against non-GATT members.
Such restrictions would not raise an issue under GATT, whose obligations only
run between signatory states. Still, there have been some instances where the Arab
League Boycott and US trade restrictions motivated by foreign policy have come
under GATT scrutiny. Under the international law doctrine of "state practice,"
the conduct of nations can itself provide informal precedents." If over some
period of time, nations consistently repudiate certain actions, this suggests that
those actions do not comport with international law. However, GATT has been
in force for over fifty years and has gone through the domestic ratification
processes of the individual signatory states. Because the treaty has so many
parties, one must be careful not to infer too much from interpretations made by
just a few signatories.
A. STATE PRACTICE AND THE ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT

The United States has always vociferously opposed the Arab League
Boycott, and Israel has naturally expressed the same view.42 The European
Economic Community and European Parliament have also expressed the view
that the secondary and tertiary Boycott is an unjustified violation of GATT.43
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia at one point agreed to "suspend" its secondary and
tertiary boycott to ease its accession.' This implies recognition-at least on the

41

See Spanogle, 27 Stetson L Rev at 1328-32 (cited in note 1).
See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States

42

note 2) (observing that the "general and consistent practice of states followed by them from
a sense of obligation" creates binding "rule of international law").
Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee (Marrakesh, Morocco Apr 13, 1994) in Doc

40

43

§ 102(2) (cited

in

No 94-0146, TN.TNC/MIN(94)/ST/44 (statement by Micha Harish, Minister of Industry
and Trade) ("We believe that the boycott is incompatible with the notion of free trade
discussed here and to oppose it is the obligation of the whole world trading system and
mainly of those parties which enjoy an extensive volume of trade with Israel.").
See Nelson and Prittie, The Economic War against the Jews at 223-24 (cited in note 35)
(observing that EEC also declared compliance with the boycott a violation of the nondiscrimination principles of the Treaty of Rome, the constitution of the Common Market).
See World Trade Organization, Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WTO Doc No
WT/ACC/SAU/6 at Q38-39 (cited in note 16) (requesting Saudi Arabia to "confirm"
removal of boycott).
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part of the WTO members who requested the move, if not on the part of the
Saudis-that the Boycott contravened WTO rules.
One contrary precedent exists. The legality of the Arab League Boycott
was raised explicitly during the negotiations in 1970 over the accession of Egypt,
which at the time called itself the United Arab Republic. Egypt refused to end its
participation in the Boycott despite the "concerns" of some contracting parties.
The Boycott supposedly did not contravene GATT obligations because it "was
considered a political decision and not trade-related, ' 46 though some nations
rejected this view.4 7 At least one commentator has argued that Egypt's accession
demonstrates that trade restrictions motivated by foreign policy concerns alone
pass GATT muster. 48
While Egypt's accession may lend some support to Saudi Arabia's
candidacy, a single, thirty-year old informal precedent-itself controversial at the
time-can hardly establish a broad principle legitimizing any foreign policy
restrictions. Moreover, Egypt could have plausibly invoked the national security
exception to justify the primary boycott, though commentators doubt this can
ever authorize secondary boycotts. Indeed, while not formally invoking the
exception, Egypt explicitly referred in its accession documents to the "state of
war" with Israel.49 In 1970 Egypt and Israel were engaged in constant and open
hostilities during the so-called War of Attrition and had three years previously
fought an all-out war in which Israel conquered Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Such a
situation plainly falls within the war-related exception of Article XXI(b)(iii). But
Israel, as noted above, is not fighting Saudi Arabia and has never attacked that
nation or given any sign of an intention to do so.
B. STATE PRACTICE AND US-IMPOSED SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
In the 1990s, the United States enacted several laws that, among other
things, establish secondary and tertiary boycotts: the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as the "Helms-Burton" Act) and the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act ("ILSA"). The US justified these measures by
reference to the national security exception, and it also invoked the purported

45
46

47

48
49

See Spanogle, 27 Stetson L Rev at 1322 n 46 (cited in note 1).
Id at 1331.
GATr Secretariat, Uruguay Round, Group of Negotiations on Goods, Negotiating Group on GAT
Articles, Article XXI, WTO Doc No MTN.GNG/NG7/W/16 (Aug 18 1987), available
online at <http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/UR/GNGNG07/W16.RFT>
(visited Oct 9, 2003) (hereinafter Uruguay Round Negotiations on Goods).
Spanogle, 27 Stetson L Rev at 1332 (cited in note 1).
Id at 1322 n 46.
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foreign policy exception.5" Washington has argued that since the measures were
taken for foreign policy reasons, a WTO tribunal would not even have
jurisdiction to determine the legitimacy of the secondary restrictions." No nation
has supported the legitimacy of the secondary boycott elements of these laws.
They have been denounced by many nations and commentators as repugnant to
a wide variety of treaty obligations, customary international law, and WTO
rules.52
Indeed, the EU filed a complaint with the WTO challenging the secondary
boycott provisions of Helms-Burton. The United States settled the matter "outof-court" immediately before the first submissions were due with the panel.5 3
President Clinton promised to use his waiver authority under the statute to
prevent enforcement of the secondary restrictions. The consensus among
commentators is that were the matter to come before a WTO dispute resolution
body, the secondary boycott provisions would be struck down.5" Of course, this
is provided that the panel would not rule that the exception is self-judgingmany commentators believe the language of Article XXI makes a nation's
determination of its essential security interests authoritative and not subject to
WTO review.
Yet it is also clear that Helms-Burton and ILSA have more to do with US
national security than the Boycott has to do with the security of Algeria or Saudi
Arabia. After all, shortly before the passage of Helms-Burton, Cuba shot down
two American aircraft (this probably does not rise to the level of "essential
national security" as required by GATT, but it is something), and Iran and Libya
have sponsored terrorist attacks on Americans. Moreover, the American laws'
secondary provisions have a very limited scope, far narrower than the provisions
50

See Robert S. Greenberger, Washington Will Boycott WYTO Panel, Wall St J A2 (Feb 21, 1997)
(quoting Commerce Department undersecretary Stuart Eizenstat as declaring that the "WTO
was not created to decide foreign-policy and national-security issues").

51

See id.

52

See Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling with Fidel: An Anaysis of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 Ariz J Intl & Comp L 575, 584 (1997); Timothy S. Dunning,
Comment, D Amato in a China Shop: Problems of Extraterritorial4ywith the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L 169, 194-95 (1998) ("Although referencing a legitimate
concern over terrorism, ILSA, if brought before a WTO panel, likely will not warrant an
exemption under the national security escape clause in Article XXI.").
See Browne, 86 Georgetown LJ at 408 (cited in note 28).
See id at 407-08 n 14, 409 n 19.
See, for example, C. Todd Piczak, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: U.S. Foreign Poliy toward
Cuba, the National Security Exception to the GATT and the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 61 U Pitt L
Rev 287, 317, 326 (1999) (arguing that WTO panel would reject GATT exceptions urged by
US to justify its secondary boycotts); Klinton W. Alexander, The Helms-Burton Act and the
WTO Challenge: Making a Casefor the UnitedStates underthe GATT NationalSecurity Exception, 11
FlaJ Intl L 559, 566-68 (1997).

53
54
55
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of the Arab League's secondary and tertiary boycotts. Helms-Burton applies only
to those foreign nationals who use "confiscated property" in Cuba that was
taken from US nationals. The statute is enforced through civil damages actions
by the owners of the property and by visa restrictions on the foreign nationals,
remedies far short of barring the foreign nationals from doing business in the
US and similarly penalizing other foreigners who do business with them. The
Arab Boycott applies to almost every sector of commerce and every transaction
regardless of its size. ILSA, by contrast, only imposes secondary boycott
measures on companies with investments of over $40 million in Iranian and
Libyan oil industries (sanctions also apply to those who sell military material, in
the case of Libya). The Boycott against Israel is far broader, extending to any
business with any contacts at all with Israel, even those that simply open an
office there. Thus if, as scholars and WTO members agree, the secondary
elements of Helms-Burton and ILSA violate WTO obligations, the Boycott does
56

so aforfiori.

V. PEACE AND FOREIGN POLICY RECONCILIATION AS GOALS
OF THE FREE TRADE SYSTEM
Text, structure, and state practice show the incompatibility of the foreign
policy purpose exception with WTO rules. This Part shows that the WTO has
foreign policy goals that would be defeated by the purported exception, and in
particular, by the use of broad boycotts as instruments of foreign relations. The
WTO has the very non-economic purpose of creating conditions that would
reduce the likelihood of war between nations. Of course, arguments from
purpose and intent are not dispositive when statutory text is clear. But when
text, purpose, and usage all point in the same direction, one need not address the
relative importance of these interpretive criteria.
Implicit in the view that the WTO only prohibits trade restrictions
motivated by protectionism is the assumption that the WTO seeks to secure a
free and open trade regime solely to secure the economic benefit of lower prices
through comparative advantage and broader competition. Certainly the
economic benefits of the GATT system are the ones most commonly

56

The US's opposition to the Arab Boycott has, not surprisingly, lead to accusations of
hypocrisy. See, for example, Bhala, 19 U PaJ Ind Econ L at 271 n 24 (cited in note 4). Thus
some commentators have suggested that at least one reason to jettison the Cuba boycott is
that it "undercuts the traditional U.S. opposition to secondary boycotts and makes it harder
for the United States to take a principled stand against the Arab boycott of Israel (and to
push Arab governments to drop the secondary and tertiary elements of that embargo)."
Theodore C. Sorensen and Richard S. Elliott, Cutting the Cord against Dictators: U.S. Embargoes
Challenge Business Communi y, NY L J 7 (Nov 20, 1995).
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discussed, 7 probably because most improper trade restrictions are in fact
motivated by economic (protectionist) considerations.
However, the WTO also has other purposes that are directly frustrated by
the use of boycotts as instruments of foreign relations. Free trade has always
been understood to be an important method of discouraging war and promoting
more amicable relations among nations. John Stuart Mill argued that "the
economical advantages of [international] commerce are surpassed in
importance" by its effects on international political relations.58 According to Mill,
trade is "the principal guarantee of the peace in the world." 9 Leading
contemporary scholars echo this view.60 Indeed, fostering the conditions for
international peace was as much in the minds of GATT's architects as was
reaping the benefits of comparative advantage.
The retaliatory tariff increases of the 1930s, in the view of many scholars,
"helped transform a trade war into actual military conflict."'" The global
depression created by trade barriers was particularly hard-felt in the alreadyimpoverished Germany, and thus helped the National Socialist Party win
popularity and elections. This bitter history informed the historic Bretton

57

58
59
60

61

See Jim Chen, Pax Mercatoria: Globalization as a Second Chance at 'Peace in Our Time," 24
Fordham Intl L J 217, 226 (2000) (pointing out that the most common argument for free
trade rests entirely on its economic benefits and thus is incomplete). See, for example, John
0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv L Rev 511, 52122, 529-30 (2000) (assuming that WTO's only goal is the creation of wealth and thus its
primary opponents are protectionist groups within nations).
John Stuart Mill, Prnctples of PoliticalEconomy 581 (Longmans 1909).
Id at 582.
See Freidrich A. Hayek, Individualism and the Economic Order 255 (Chicago 1948) (arguing that
"the abolition of economic barriers" is an "indispensable condition" for "prevent[ing] war
... by eliminating causes of friction" between nations); Robert W. McGee, A Trade Poy for
Free Societies 24 (Quorum 1994) ("[Tjhere is substantial evidence to suggest that lack of free
trade is a threat to peace.); John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Poliy of
InternationalEconomic Relations 135 (MIT 1989) ("MFN can serve the functions of lessening
tensions among nations and of inhibiting temptations for short-term ad hoc government
policies which could be tension-creating in a world already too tense."); Ezrahi, 31 Law &
Poly in Ind Bus 123-24 (cited in note 33) (arguing that WTO and GATT system is crucial to
improved international relations, and particularly reconciliation between Arab states and
Israel, and thus trade rules that impede such rapprochement, like GATT's opt-out clause,
should be narrowly interpreted or abolished).
Chen, 24 Fordham Ind L J at 226 (cited in note 57). See also, McGee, A Trade PocforFree
Societies at 24-25 (cited in note 60) (arguing that trade barriers such as tariffs and the
American embargo of Japan helped cause World War II, and that "[m]any other wars were
caused, at least in part, by trade restrictions, which are often used as economic weapons-a
substitute for military action").
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Woods meeting from which GATT emerged.62 "Trade, in a rules-based system,
would promote economic interdependence among nations, making another
global war improbable ....As one US observer... put it at the time: 'economic
freedom for all is the basic American foreign policy for the prevention of
war."' 63 Still, some of those involved in the creation of GATT saw a narrower
role for the organization, one consistent with the foreign policy exception.
Indeed, some representatives to the subcommittee that originally drafted Article
XXI in 1948 proposed inserting a foreign policy exception into that Article.
They argued that GATT "ought to make provision for economic measures
which are closely linked with political questions ... in the sense of excluding
them, because they believed that an economic measure taken for political
reasons was not properly speaking an economic measure but a political
measure." 64 But while this position was endorsed by several representatives, the
subcommittee did not in fact "make provision" for such an exception, and the
nations that joined the agreement signed it without such an exception. The
political leaders of the signatory states saw GATT as having "an unequivocal
mandate to keep the peace., 65
The free trade system promotes peaceable foreign relations in several ways.
First, the cross-border ties formed by businessmen and the exposure to foreign
cultures during business deals can increase transnational understanding. As a
country grows more prosperous, it stands to lose more through conflict and thus
develops a greater distaste for war. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, free
trade creates groups of people within potentially hostile nations that have a
strong interest in maintaining peace, because they trade with the potential
enemy. These groups can pressure their domestic governments to avoid actions
that might lead to conflict. Trade barriers between nations have the opposite
66
effect.
As the successor to GATT,the WTO is also concerned with creating the
necessary conditions for international peace.6 ' The WTO itself proclaims that
62

63

64
65

66
67

See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 6 Public Controls on InternationalTrade 15 (Matthew Bender 2d ed
1983) (noting that the creators of GATT were informed by the "perception" that trade
restraints had contributed to the outbreak of World War II).
WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero, From Vision to Reality: The MultilateralTrading Sjstem
at Fify, Address to the Brookings Institution and the World Affairs Council Forum "The
Global Trading System: A GATT 50th Anniversary Forum," San Jose, California (Feb 26,
1998), available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sprre/sanos-e.htm>
(visited Sept 26, 2003).
GATT Secretariat, Uruguay Round, Group of Negotiations on Goods 12 (cited in note 47).
Chen, 24 Fordham Ind L J at 227-28 (cited in note 57).
Hayek, Individualism and the Economic Orderat 257 (cited in note 60).
Chen, 24 Fordham Ind L J at 225 (cited in note 57) (arguing that the WTO was "consciously
designed to keep the peace and remain[s] quite effective in this role").
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"peace" is one of its principal benefits: "[1] f trade flows smoothly and both sides
enjoy a healthy commercial relationship, political conflict is less likely."6 Renato
Ruggiero, then-Director General of the WTO, has declared that economic
prosperity and political tranquility are just two sides of the same GATT coin.69
And former US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky has said that
Washington's trade policy seeks to end the Boycott specifically to cultivate the
conditions for peace:
The region is deeply fragmented, most of all because of the boycotts
and isolation Israel's neighbors imposed on it fifty years ago ....To reduce
these barriers and promote a greater degree of integration ... would be to
strengthen the stake that Middle Eastern governments would have in peace
70
and regional stability.
Given that the WTO system is not limited in its purposes to securing
economic gains, it would be incongruous to interpret GATT as applying only to
measures adopted for economic purposes. Amicable relations between nations is
also a goal of the WTO, and the Arab League Boycott is designed to frustrate
this goal. Indeed, as UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold put it, the
Boycott is "deadweight" on regional peace prospects. 1 It is an economic form
72
of warfare, standing in the way of the peace the WTO seeks to promote.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SAUDI ARABIAN ACCESSION
The previous sections of this Article have shown, through an examination
of GATT's text, structure, usage, and goals that the agreement does not excuse
discriminatory trade restrictions simply because they are designed to advance
foreign policy goals rather than to protect domestic industry. Since, aside from
the purported foreign policy exception, the secondary and tertiary boycotts are
prima faie violations of GATT obligations, they are illegal under WTO rules.
This should obviously raise doubts about the merits of the accession bids of
Saudi Arabia and other Boycott enforcers. The practical question is whether the
Boycott should be an absolute bar to Riyadh's accession or whether Saudi
Arabia could be allowed to accede (assuming it satisfies other requirements) and
the Boycott dealt with within the WTO system. This Article contends that an
68
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World Trade Organization, 10 Benefits of the WFTO Trading System, available online at
<www.wto.org/english/res-e/doloade/10b-e.pdf> (visited Oct 22, 2003).
Ruggiero, From Vision to Reality (cited in note 63).
US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Bridges to Peace: American Trade Poliy in the
Middle East, Address to Hadassah, St. Petersburg, Florida (Feb 26, 2000) available online at
http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/barshefsky/barshefsky-64.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2003).
Lindesay Parrott, U.N. ChiefAssails Boycott of Israel,NY Times Al (Aug 9, 1957).
See Lowenfeld, 3 Trade Controls at 321 (cited in note 8) ("The Arab boycott is an expression
of belligerency without actual war, and of a deep-seated resentment, fear, and hatred of
Israel, and everything and everybody that has helped or would help Israel.").
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end to the secondary and tertiary Boycott should be an absolute prerequisite to
accession. Given the Boycott's incompatibility with WTO obligations, allowing a
nation to join WTO with the Boycott in place would be an irreparable mistake.
There is no adequate procedure for dealing with the Boycott within the
WTO framework. Saudi Arabia might invoke Article XXI(b) to justify the
secondary and tertiary Boycott. As has been noted above, commentators have
been concerned about the potential for bad faith and abusive invocations of
Article XXI(b). For while commentators uniformly believe that the national
security exception could not justify a secondary and tertiary Boycott, many also
view the national security exception as self-judging: the Article can be read as
explicitly leaving it to each nation to conclusively determine whether the national
security exception is appropriate, with no possibility for review by a WTO
dispute-resolution panel. Many observers believe that the reason that abusive
and opportunistic invocations of Article XXI(b) have not been more common is
that nations want to be seen as playing by the international trade rules.73 But the
secondary and tertiary Boycott is so repugnant to elementary free trade norms
that it calls into doubt the boycotters' concern for their reputation in this regard.
In the Helms-Burton controversy, the United States invoked Article
XXI(b) to justify trade restrictions that were widely regarded as motivated by
general foreign policy concerns, not "essential national security," and
Washington refused to recognize the jurisdiction of a WTO panel over the
question. The American position jeopardized the authority of the WTO
tribunals, and was regarded as imperiling the organization itself. If Saudi Arabia
were admitted to the organization with its half-century-old Boycott intact, the
stage would be set for another showdown that could undermine the WTO's
authority and efficacy. Washington ultimately withdrew the challenged practices,
but it is far from clear that Riyadh would back down in the face of a legal
challenge by a member state. The Saudis could see their accession as evidence of
the present member nations' tacit consent to the Boycott. The Saudis have
enforced the Boycott for more than five decades, while the Helms-Burton
provisions had been in place for only a few years: this suggests the Saudis will be
even less inclined to abandon the Boycott if a challenge were brought before a
WTO panel than the US was.
Scholars have come up with numerous procedural schemes to police bad
faith invocations of Article XXI, as well as other GATT abuses and violations.
Indeed, one of the perennial issues in GATT jurisprudence is distinguishing
legitimate environmental, cultural, health, and safety measures from disguised
73

See, for example, Jackson, The World Trading System at 204 (cited in note 60) ("Because of
th[e] danger of abuse, contracting parties have been very reluctant to formally invoke Article
XXI, even in circumstances where it seems applicable.").
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protectionism. Yet clearly the simplest procedural device is the accession process
itself: not to allow likely scofflaws into the WTO until they have clearly forsaken
their discriminatory ways. The search for procedural devices, for methods to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate restrictions, is necessitated by the
fact that such measures are usually adopted at some point after accession. If they
are already in place, preventing accession is the easiest and surest safeguard
against such abuses.
Even if the legality of the Boycott could be brought before a WTO panel,
adequate relief for the harm imposed could not be secured. The economic losses
caused by the Boycott cannot be calculated with any precision. 4 This is because
the Boycott works through intimidation and deterrence. It prevents firms from
considering business opportunities in Israel or with non-Israeli entities that have
connections with Israel. Because the Boycott has been in place for half a
century, there is no basis for calculating the level of foreign trade with Israel that
would exist in the absence of the Boycott and thus no measure of the lost
business it caused."5 Firms that have decided not to consider transacting with
Israel or other firms on the blacklist will not step forward to admit it, and it is
likely such decisions to avoid exploring trade opportunities with Israel would not
always be fully conscious or articulated.
The WTO operates largely on trust and reciprocity, on the understanding
of member nations that they all will be better off playing by the rules. And the
accession process, especially for nations that have not had long histories of
liberal trade policies, is about the aspirant making painful reforms to signal its
newfound commitment to free trade as well as about negotiating specific tariff
reductions. Such reforms serve as a bonding device, or evidence of intent: they
demonstrate the aspirant's seriousness of purpose. As the former Director
General of the WTO has said, accession "very often [entails] major changes in
national policies in order to be able to sign on to binding commitments across
the whole trade spectrum."7 6
Allowing a boycotting nation to accede would set a dangerous precedent. It
would grant legitimacy to the foreign policy exception, possibly encouraging its
invocation by existing members to justify discriminatory trade policies. And
given the blank-check nature of the purported foreign policy exception, this
74
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National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriersat 3 (noting that the harm the Boycott
causes US businesses is "difficult to quantify accurately") (cited in note 20); Dan S. Chill, The
Arab Boycott of Israel: Economic Aggression and World Reaction 23 (Praeger 1976) (discussing the
"impossibility of estimating the economic activity that would result were the Boycott
rendered inoperative").
US Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriersat 3 (cited in
note 20).
Ruggiero, From Vision to Reality (cited in note 63).
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could wreak havoc with the WTO's rule-based approach. As Ruggiero has said,
"cwe must complete these negotiations [with trade 'giants' such as Saudi Arabia]
as soon as possible .... 77
But, equally, enlargement of the WTO must strengthen
the system, not dilute it."
WTO rules apply, in the absence of an explicit GATT exception, to trade
restrictions adopted out of hatred as much as those adopted out of greed. Saudi
Arabia's secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel constitute facial violations of
WTO obligations. If Riyadh accedes without having abandoned these practices,
it would be a defeat for the free trade system born at Bretton Woods. It would
open up the Pandora's Box of the foreign policy exception. Perhaps most
distressingly, it would suggest that WTO members, with whom the accession
decision rests, care little more about non-discriminatory trade than does Riyadh.
The United States at least-as part of its commitment to free trade, its defense
of its own economic interests, and its desire to lay the groundwork for closer
relations between Middle Eastern states-should insist that Saudi Arabia
discontinue and disavow the Boycott before engaging in any further accession
78
negotiations.
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For a discussion of the specific conditions Washington should establish for accession, see
E.V. Kontorovich, Rijadh's [KTO Outrage, NY Post 31 (Dec 26, 2002).
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